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Abstract—This paper studies secure video streaming in cache-
enabled small cell networks, where some of the cache-enabled
small cell base stations (BSs) helping in video delivery are
untrusted. Unfavorably, caching improves the eavesdropping
capability of these untrusted helpers as they may intercept both
the cached and the delivered video files. To address this issue,
we propose joint caching and scalable video coding (SVC) of
video files to enable secure cooperative multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) transmission and, at the same time, exploit
the cache memory of both the trusted and untrusted BSs
for improving the system performance. Considering imperfect
channel state information (CSI) at the transmitters, we formulate
a two-timescale non-convex mixed-integer robust optimization
problem to minimize the total transmit power required for
guaranteeing the quality of service (QoS) and secrecy during
video streaming. We develop an iterative algorithm based on a
modified generalized Benders decomposition (GBD) to solve the
problem optimally, where the caching and the cooperative trans-
mission policies are determined via offline (long-timescale) and
online (short-timescale) optimization, respectively. Furthermore,
inspired by the optimal algorithm, a low-complexity suboptimal
algorithm based on a greedy heuristic is proposed. Simulation
results show that the proposed schemes achieve significant gains
in power efficiency and secrecy performance compared to several
baseline schemes.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, untrusted nodes, wireless
caching, MIMO, non-convex optimization, resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
S
MALL cells are among the most promising solutions for
meeting the enormous capacity requirements introduced
by video streaming applications in the fifth-generation (5G)
wireless networks [2]. By densely deploying low-power base
stations (BSs), both the spectral and energy efficiencies of
wireless communication systems can be improved signifi-
cantly. However, to achieve these performance gains, high-
capacity secure backhaul links are required to transport the
video files from the Internet to the small cell BSs. While
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wireless backhauling is usually preferred for small cells due to
its low cost and high flexibility in deployment [3], the capacity
provided by wireless backhauling is often insufficient, which
deteriorates the overall system performance [4] and limits the
maximum number of concurrent streaming users/connections.
Moreover, since wireless transmission is susceptible to eaves-
dropping, the security of wireless backhauling is a fundamental
concern for 5G wireless networks.
Recently, wireless caching has been proposed as a viable
solution to enhance the capacity of small cell backhauling
[5]–[15]. Built upon the content-centric networking paradigm,
in wireless caching, the most popular contents are pre-stored
at the access points or BSs in close proximity of the user
equipments (UEs). Consequently, the backhaul traffic is of-
floaded by reusing the cached content [5], [6]. Caching as an
alternative to small cell backhauling was first investigated in
[7], where caching was shown to also substantially reduce
the average downloading delay. Besides, caching improves
the energy efficiency of wireless backhauling systems as was
shown in [8]. In [9], caching was optimized to facilitate power-
efficient cooperative multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
transmission in small cell networks. In [10], joint caching and
buffering for small cell networks was proposed to overcome
the backhaul capacity bottleneck and the half-duplex trans-
mission constraint simultaneously to enable fast downloading
of video files. In [11], [12], coded caching was introduced,
which reduces the backhaul load by exploiting coded multicast
transmission for simultaneous delivery of different files. Coded
caching was extended to various network scenarios, see [13]–
[15] and references therein.
On the other hand, although communication secrecy is
of high importance in wireless networks, providing security
for networks employing wireless caching has been a major
challenge. This is because current video streaming appli-
cations, e.g. YouTube and Netflix, mainly rely on end-to-
end encryption schemes such as the hypertext transfer pro-
tocol secure (HTTPS) [23] to ensure communication security.
However, with such schemes, the benefits of content-centric
networking vanish as encrypted contents are uniquely defined
for each user request and cannot be reused to serve other user
requests [5]. For this reason, caching was mainly considered
for content without security restrictions in the literature [5]–
[10]. To overcome this limitation, physical layer security (PLS)
schemes for wireless caching were proposed in [16]–[18]. As
PLS techniques rely on wiretap channel coding instead of
source encryption, content can still be reused at the wireless
edge for secure wireless transmission, and hence, caching and
PLS are compatible. In [16], cache-enabled cooperative MIMO
2transmission was shown to be an effective physical layer
mechanism for increasing the secrecy rate for video delivery in
homogeneous cellular networks. However, a secure backhaul
for cache placement was required in [16], which cannot always
be guaranteed with wireless backhauling in practice. Consid-
ering an insecure backhaul, a secure cache placement strategy
for heterogeneous cellular networks (HetNets) was developed
in [17], whereby eavesdroppers tapping the insecure backhaul
can be prevented from obtaining a sufficient number of coded
packets for successful recovery of the video file. Assuming
caching at the end users, the authors of [18] proposed a secure
coded multicast scheme for relay networks to prevent end
users and external eavesdroppers from intercepting the non-
requested and the delivered files, respectively.
However, [16]–[18] optimistically assumed that the (cache)
helpers can be trusted for cooperation and that the cache
cannot be exploited for eavesdropping purposes. These as-
sumptions may be unrealistic for HetNets. In particular, due to
the distributed network architecture, cache-enabled small cell
BSs can be untrusted helpers, i.e., they may be potential eaves-
droppers1, and hence, may not cooperate altruistically [20]–
[22]. Examples of untrusted helpers include home-owned and
open-access small cell BSs which can be easily manipulated by
third parties to eavesdrop premium video streaming services,
for which they have not paid, and/or users’ private video files.
In contrast to trusted small cell BSs deployed and owned by
the service provider, at these untrusted small cell BSs, user
data is left unprotected and prone to eavesdropping because
the small cell BS itself is responsible for encrypting and de-
crypting the user data before forwarding it to the macro BS and
the intended users, respectively [20]–[22]. Moreover, different
from the case of cache-disabled eavesdroppers2 considered in
[16], [17], the cache memory equipped at the untrusted helpers
unfavorably enhances their eavesdropping capability as they
can intercept both the cached and the delivered video data, and
utilize the cached video data as side information to improve
reception.
Two fundamental questions need to be addressed when
cache helpers are untrusted: (a) Can cooperation with un-
trusted helpers still yield secrecy benefits? That is, can the
cache deployed at the untrusted helpers be utilized to improve
the system performance? If so, (b) how to cache and cooper-
ate intelligently to reap the possible performance gains? To
our knowledge, state-of-the-art small cell networks perform
only passive authentication of BSs and completely exclude
untrusted BSs from participating in cooperative transmis-
sion [21], [22]. However, in this case, untrusted BS cannot
be used to improve the system performance3.
In [25], untrusted helpers without caching have been inves-
tigated for relay networks. It was shown that cooperation with
1In this paper, we only consider passive eavesdroppers which remain silent
during eavesdropping. Studying the case of active eavesdroppers such as
jamming and spoofing attackers [19] is an interesting topic for future work.
2The case considered in this paper is more general than that in [16], [17].
In fact, the eavesdroppers in [16], [17] can be viewed as untrusted helpers
with zero cache capacity.
3We note that, as untrusted BSs present the man-in-the-middle threat to
wireless networks, HTTPS also cannot facilitate secure cooperative transmis-
sion [24].
compress-and-forward relays yields a positive secrecy rate
even if the relays are untrusted. However, the problem studied
in this paper is more challenging as the untrusted helpers
can cache content to enhance their eavesdropping capability.
Thus, the solutions proposed in [25] are not applicable and
a new study is needed. In this paper, to facilitate secure
cooperative transmission with untrusted cache helpers, we
propose an advanced caching scheme that combines scalable
video coding (SVC) and cooperative MIMO transmission.
Specifically, each video file is encoded by SVC into base-layer
subfiles, containing basic-quality and independently decodable
video information, and enhancement-layer subfiles, containing
high-quality video information which is decodable only after
the base layer has been successfully decoded. By caching
the enhancement-layer subfiles across all BSs and the base-
layer subfiles only across trusted BSs, secure cooperation of
all BSs is enabled by exploiting the encoding and decoding
structure of SVC. Thereby, the large virtual transmit antenna
array formed by all BSs that have cached the same subfile
introduces additional degrees of freedom (DoFs) which may
be utilized for secure and power-efficient video streaming.
To reap the cache-enabled secrecy benefits, a centralized
framework for caching and delivery optimization is adopted.
Hence, the proposed architecture follows the cloud radio
access network (CRAN) philosophy [4], [26] which has been
advocated for next-generation HetNets for cooperative MIMO
transmission [27], [28] and advanced resource allocation [29].
In the conference version of this paper [1], we investigated
cache-enabled secure transmission by assuming perfect knowl-
edge of all channels. However, in practice, the channel state
information (CSI) gathered at the central controller, e.g. the
macro BS, is imperfect due to quantization noise and feedback
delay, which deteriorates the system performance and has
to be taken into account for system design. To mitigate the
information leakage from the trusted BSs to the untrusted BSs,
artificial noise (AN) based jamming is applied in this paper.
In the literature [29]–[31], AN has been employed to effec-
tively reduce the receive signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the eavesdropper without interfering the desired
users. In this paper, we consider cooperative AN transmission
by the trusted BSs for power-efficient jamming to combat the
eavesdropping of the untrusted BSs. By considering untrusted
BSs and imperfect CSI, we jointly optimize caching and
cooperative data and AN transmission for a secure and power-
efficient system design. In particular, a two-timescale robust
optimization problem is formulated for minimization of the
transmit power required for secure video streaming under
imperfect CSI. The main contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
• We study a new secrecy threat in small cell networks
originating from untrusted cache helpers, i.e., cache-
enabled eavesdropping small cell BSs. To facilitate secure
cooperative MIMO transmission of trusted and untrusted
small cell BSs, we propose a secure caching scheme
based on SVC.
• We optimize the caching and the cooperative delivery
policies for minimization of the transmit power while
3guaranteeing quality-of-service (QoS) and communica-
tion secrecy under imperfect CSI. We show that the
optimal delivery decisions can be obtained by semidefi-
nite programming (SDP) relaxation with probability one
under mild conditions. For the optimal caching decisions,
an optimal iterative algorithm is developed based on a
modified generalized Benders decomposition (GBD). To
reduce the computational complexity, a polynomial-time
suboptimal greedy scheme is also proposed.
• Our simulation results show that the proposed robust
schemes can efficiently exploit the cache capacities of
both trusted and untrusted small cell BSs to enable power-
efficient and secure video streaming in heterogeneous
small cell networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the system model for cooperative secure
video streaming in the presence of untrusted cache helpers.
The formulation and solution of the proposed optimization
problem are provided in Sections III and IV, respectively.
In Section V, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
schemes and compare it to that of several baseline schemes.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: R and C denote the sets of real and complex
numbers, respectively; ℜ{z} denotes the real part of z ∈ C;
IL is an L×L identity matrix; 1M×N and 0M×N are M ×N
all-one and all-zero matrices, respectively; (·)T and (·)H
are the transpose and complex conjugate transpose operators,
respectively; ‖·‖ℓ denotes the ℓ-norm of a vector; ‖·‖F , tr(·),
rank(·), det(·), and λmax(·) denote the Frobenius norm, the
trace, the rank, the determinant, and the maximal eigenvalue of
a square matrix, respectively; E(·) is the expectation operator;
the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution is
denoted by CN (µ,C) with mean vector µ and covariance
matrix C; ∼ stands for “distributed as”; diag(x) is a diagonal
matrix with the diagonal elements given by vector x; |X |
represents the cardinality of set X ; A  0 andA ≻ 0 indicate
that matrix A is positive semidefinite and positive definite,
respectively; finally, [x]+ stands for max{0, x}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Topology
We consider downlink wireless video streaming in a het-
erogeneous small cell network, where M small cell BSs,
each equipped with a cache memory of size Cmaxm bits, are
distributed in the coverage area of a macro BS, see Fig. 1(a).
For convenience, a list with key notations used in this paper
is provided in Table I. Let m ∈ M , {0, 1, . . . ,M} be
the BS index, where m = 0 refers to the macro BS. The
macro BS is connected to the video server on the Internet
via a dedicated secure high-capacity backhaul link such as
optical fiber. For simplicity of notation, the backhaul to the
macro BS is modeled as a cache with an equivalent capacity
of Cmax0 bits. In contrast, the small cell BSs are connected to
the macro BS via wireless backhaul links for convenience of
deployment. Assume that BSm,m ∈M, is equipped withNm
antennas. The total number of transmit antennas is denoted by
N ,
∑
m∈MNm.
The video server owns a library of F video files, indexed
by F , {1, . . . , F}, to be streamed to K single-antenna UEs,
indexed by K , {1, . . . ,K}. The size of file f is Vf bits.
Employing SVC coding, as utilized e.g. for wireless video
delivery in the H.264/Moving Picture Expert Group (MPEG)-
4 standard [32]–[34], each video file f ∈ F is encoded
into one base-layer subfile, (f, 0), and L − 1 enhancement-
layer subfiles, (f, l), l ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}, where the infor-
mation embedded in enhancement layer l is used to refine
the information contained in the previous layers 0, . . . , l − 1.
Let L , {0, . . . , L− 1} be the index set of all layers. The
size of subfile (f, l) is Vf,l bits. The base layer can be
decoded independent of the enhancement layers. In contrast,
enhancement layer l ∈ L\ {0} can be decoded only after layers
0, . . . , l− 1 have already been decoded. Therefore, the layers
have to be decoded in a sequential manner [32]. Due to this
specific encoding and decoding structure, only the base layer
has to be protected in order to ensure communication secrecy.
An eavesdropper, who cannot decode the base layer, will also
not be able to decode any of the enhancement layers.
The small cell BSs serve as helpers of the macro BS in
delivering the video files. However, a subset of the small cell
BSs are untrusted. These BSs may leak the cached video data
and eavesdrop the transmitted video data while utilizing the
cached data as side information. Let MT , {0, 1, . . . , J}
and MU , {J + 1, . . . ,M} denote the sets of trusted and
untrusted BSs having a total number of NT ,
∑
m∈MT
Nm
andNU ,
∑
m∈MU
Nm antennas, respectively, where J ≤M
and NT + NU = N . In this paper, we assume that the
set of untrusted BSs, MU , is known. In practice, untrusted
BSs may largely be home-owned and open-access small cell
BSs which have insufficient security protection and can easily
be compromised by third parties. Due to the eavesdropping
and intensive processing, untrusted BSs may consume a large
power and/or experience a long end-to-end latency even if
the uplink and downlink throughputs are small. Hence, the
power/delay versus throughput pattern of untrusted BSs is
statistically different from that of trusted operator-owned BSs
such that they constitute outliers. Therefore, by exploiting the
power, delay, and throughput records of all BSs collected by
the service providers, the set of untrusted BSs can be estimated
by applying state-of-the-art outlier detection methods, e.g.,
supervised and unsupervised learning techniques [35]–[37].
The considered system is time slotted and the duration of
a time slot is smaller than the channel coherence time. We
consider a two-timescale control for caching and delivery. As
shown in Fig. 1(b), the video files in the cache are updated
every T0 time slots, referred as one period, based on the
historical profiles of user preferences and CSI. In contrast, the
video delivery decisions are determined in each time slot based
on the actual requests of the users and instantaneous CSI.
We have T0 ≫ 1, as the users’ preferences vary on a much
slower scale (e.g., from day to day) than the user requests. For
notational simplicity, we consider the system only during one
typical period T0 , {1, . . . , T0} and the corresponding time
slots are indexed by t ∈ T0.
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LIST OF KEY NOTATIONS.
M, MT , MU Sets of M BSs, J trusted BSs, and M − J untrusted BSs
N , NT , NU Total number of antennas at all BSs, trusted BSs, and untrusted BSs
MCoopf,l Subset of cooperating BSs for delivery of subfile (f, l)
K, F , L, T0 Sets of K users, F video files, L layer subfiles per file, and T0 time slots
ρ , (k, f), S Request of user k for file f and set of user requests
κ(ρ), f(ρ) Requesting UE and requested file corresponding to ρ
qf,l,m ∈ {0, 1} Binary cooperative delivery decisions for subfile (f, l) at BS m
sρ,l,t Source symbol of subfile (f, l) for serving request ρ at time t
wρ,l,m,t, wρ,l,t Beamforming vectors of BS m and BS set M for sending symbol sρ,l,t
vt, Vt AN and its covariance matrix at time t
Cmaxm Cache size at BS m
Rρ,l,t, R
sec
ρ,l,t Achievable rate and achievable secrecy rate at user κ(ρ) for decoding sρ,l,t
Rj,ρ,l,t Capacity of untrusted BS j for eavesdropping symbol sρ,l,t
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Fig. 1. (a) System model for secure video delivery in a heterogeneous
network, where a trusted and an untrusted small cell BS are distributed in the
coverage area of a macro BS; (b) caching and delivery control are performed
in two timescales.
B. Secure Video Caching and Delivery
As the cache helpers in set MU are untrusted, only the
enhancement layers are cached at BSs m ∈ MU . Hence,
the cached subfiles cannot be used by the untrusted BSs to
reconstruct the original video files as long as they do not
have access to the base-layer subfiles. Meanwhile, BSs that
have the same base-layer or enhancement-layer subfile cached,
can employ cooperative transmission for power-efficient and
secure delivery of the subfile to the UEs. On the other hand,
video files that are uncached at the small cell BSs can be
delivered only by the macro BS. Let qf,l,m = 1 indicate that
subfile (f, l) is cached at BS m, and qf,l,m = 0 otherwise.
The cache placement has to satisfy the condition
C1: qf,l,m ∈ {0, 1} , ∀(f, l) ∈ F × L, ∀m ∈M, and
qf,0,m = 0, ∀f ∈ F , m ∈MU , (1)
and the capacity constraint
C2:
∑
(f,l)∈F×L
qf,l,mVf,l ≤ Cmaxm , m ∈M. (2)
During data delivery, the set of BSs cooperating for
the delivery of subfile (f, l) is denoted by MCoopf,l ,
{m ∈ M | qf,l,m = 1}. Assume that a UE requests one file
but possibly multiple layers of the file at a time. We denote
a request from user κ for file f by ρ , (κ, f) and the set of
requests by S ⊆ K × F . For convenience, the requesting UE
and the requested file corresponding to ρ are denoted by κ(ρ)
and f(ρ), respectively. Moreover, user κ(ρ) may request Lρ
layers, indexed by Lρ , {0, 1, . . . , Lρ − 1}.
We assume a frequency flat fading channel for video data
transmission. As the worst case, we assume that the untrusted
BSs are full-duplex, i.e., they can simultaneously eavesdrop
the video information intended for the UEs and participate in
the cooperative delivery of the cached files. In time slot t ∈
T0, the self-interference [38], [39] at BS j ∈ MU caused by
simultaneous reception and transmission at the same frequency
is denoted by cj,t. Let xt ∈ CN×1 denote the joint transmit
signal of BS set M. The received signals at user κ(ρ) and
the untrusted BSs, denoted by yρ,t ∈ C and yU ,j,t ∈ CNj×1,
j ∈MU , respectively, are given by
yρ,t = h
H
ρ,txt + zρ,t and yU ,j,t =G
H
j,txt + cj,t + zj,t, (3)
where hρ,t = [h
H
ρ,0,t, . . . ,h
H
ρ,M,t]
H ∈ CN×1 and
Gj,t = [G
H
j,0,t, . . . ,G
H
j,j−1,t,0
H
Nj×Nj
,GHj,j+1,t, . . . ,G
H
j,M,t]
H
∈ CN×Nj are the channel vectors/matrices from BS set M
to user κ(ρ) and BS j, respectively. hρ,m,t ∈ CNm×1 and
Gj,m,t ∈ CNm×Nj model the channels between BS m ∈M
and the respective receivers. The term 0HNj×Nj in the definition
of Gj,t accounts for the fact that the self-interference at BS
j is included in cj,t. Furthermore, zρ,t ∼ CN (0, σ2) and
zj,t ∼ CN (0, σ2j INj ) are the zero-mean complex Gaussian
noises at the users and the BSs with variance σ2 and covari-
ance matrix σ2j INj , respectively.
The source symbols of subfile (f, l) for serving request
ρ in time slot t, denoted by sρ,l,t ∈ C, l ∈ Lρ, are
5complex Gaussian random variables with sρ,l,t ∼ CN (0, 1).
Let wρ,l,t , [w
H
ρ,l,0,t, . . .,w
H
ρ,l,M,t]
H ∈ CN×1 denote the
joint beamforming vector for transmit symbol sρ,l,t, where
wρ,l,m,t ∈ CNm×1 is the individual beamforming vector used
by BS m ∈ M in time slot t. Then, the joint transmit signal
of BS set M in time slot t ∈ T0 is given by
xt =
∑
ρ∈S
∑
l∈Lρ
wρ,l,tsρ,l,t + vt, (4)
where superposition coding is used to superimpose the Lρ
layers intended for user κ(ρ) [40]. Herein, complex Gaussian
distributed AN, vt ∈ CN×1, is sent cooperatively by the
trusted BSs in set MT to proactively interfere the recep-
tion of the untrusted BSs in set MU [30]. We assume
vt ∼ CN (0, Vt), where Vt ∈ CN×N is the covariance
matrix of the AN, i.e., Vt , E[vtv
H
t ]  0. As vt is
cooperatively injected only by the trusted BS set MT , we
require ΛUVt = 0, where ΛU is an N × N diagonal
matrix given by ΛU = diag
(
0TNT×1,1
T
NU×1
)
, to ensure that
the components of Vt which correspond to untrusted BSs
are equal to zero. Moreover, for BS m ∈ M, participating
in cooperative transmission of sρ,l,t is possible only if the
requested subfile is cached at the BS, i.e., we require
C3: tr
(
Λmwρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,t
) ≤ qf(ρ),l,mPmaxm ,
m ∈ M, ρ ∈ S, l ∈ Lρ, t ∈ T0, (5)
where Pmaxm is the maximum transmit power at BS
m, and Λm is an N × N diagonal matrix given by
Λm = diag
(
0T
(
∑m−1
j=0 Nj)×1
,1TNm×1,0
T
(
∑
M
j=m+1 Nj)×1
)
such
that tr
(
Λmwρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,t
) ≡ tr(wρ,l,m,twHρ,l,m,t) holds. C3
enforces Λmwρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,t = 0, i.e., wρ,l,m,t = 0, when
qf,l,m=0, i.e., m /∈MCoopf,l . Otherwise, when qf,l,m=1, i.e.,
m ∈MCoopf,l , C3 ensures that the maximum transmit power,
Pmaxm , of BS m∈M is not exceeded. A constraint of the form
of C3 is also referred to as a big-M constraint [41]. Based on
C1 and C3, we have wρ,0,m,t≡0, ∀m∈MU , i.e., the base-
layer subfiles cannot be transmitted by untrusted BSs.
C. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Each user employs successive interference cancellation
(SIC) at the receiver [40]. The base-layer subfile is decoded
first, as it is required for the decoding of the other layers.
In decoding the subfile of layer l ∈ Lρ\ {0}, the previously
decoded lower layers 0, . . . , l − 1 are first removed from
the received signal for interference cancellation. This process
continues until layer Lρ − 1 is decoded [32]. Define the
interference cancellation coefficient aρ
′,l′
ρ,l ∈ {0, 1}, where
aρ
′,l′
ρ,l = 1 indicates that the transmission of subfile (f(ρ
′), l′)
interferes that of subfile (f(ρ), l), and aρ
′,l′
ρ,l = 0 otherwise.
By adopting SIC decoding for the SVC video files, we have
aρ
′,l′
ρ,l =
{
0, if ρ = ρ′, l ≥ l′;
1, otherwise.
(6)
The instantaneous achievable rate (bits/s/Hz) for layer l ∈ Lρ
at user κ(ρ) is given by
Rρ,l,t = log2
(
1 +
1
σ2
∣∣hHρ,twρ,l,t∣∣2
1 + 1σ2 Iρ,l,t +
1
σ2h
H
ρ,tVthρ,t
)
, (7)
Iρ,l,t =
∑
(ρ′,l′) 6=(ρ,l)
aρ
′,l′
ρ,l
∣∣hHρ,twρ′,l′,t∣∣2 , (8)
where Iρ,l,t is the residual interference term for decoding layer
l of user κ(ρ) and (ρ, l) 6= (ρ′, l′) indicates ρ 6= ρ′ and/or
l 6= l′.
On the other hand, the untrusted BSs may eavesdrop the
video information intended for the users. For guaranteeing
communication secrecy, the proposed secure delivery scheme
is designed to avoid information leakage even under worst-case
conditions. Specifically, we assume that BS j ∈ MU can fully
cancel the self-interference power cj,t during eavesdropping
4,
and hence, achieves the full-duplex capacity upper bound for
layer l of the signal intended for user κ(ρ) given by
Rj,ρ,l,t = log2 det
(
INj +
1
σ2j
Z−1j,ρ,l,tG
H
j,twρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,tGj,t
)
,
(9)
Zj,ρ,l,t = INj +
1
σ2j
GHj,tVtGj,t +
1
σ2j
Ψj,ρ,l,t ≻ 0, (10)
Ψj,ρ,l,t =
∑
(ρ′,l′) 6=(ρ,l)
aρ
′,l′
ρ,l
(
1− qf(ρ′),l′,j
)
GHj,twρ′,l′,tw
H
ρ′,l′,tGj,t.
(11)
Note that if subfile (f, l′) is cached at BS j ∈ MU , we have
1−qf,l′,j = 0 in (11). That is, in addition to SIC, BS j ∈ MU
can also utilize the cached video data as side information to
suppress the interference caused by subfile (f, l′). The secrecy
rate achievable at user κ(ρ) for decoding layer l ∈ Lρ in time
slot t ∈ T0 is given by
Rsecρ,l,t =
[
Rρ,l,t − max
j∈MU
Rj,ρ,l,t
]+
. (12)
Remark 1. Note that a passive eavesdropper, as considered
for non-caching networks in [29]–[31] and caching networks
in [16], [17], can be cast as an untrusted BS having no cache
memory or no data cached. Considering C1–C3, such an eaves-
dropper will not participate in the cooperative transmission of
the video files. Thus, the untrusted cache helpers considered in
this paper correspond to a more general eavesdropping model
than that investigated in the literature [16], [17], [29]–[31].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the adopted imperfect
CSI model for video delivery. Then, a two-timescale robust
optimization problem is formulated for minimization of the
total BS transmit power required for video streaming under
4In practice, if self-interference is not perfectly canceled, the residual
self-interference impairs the eavesdropping at the untrusted BSs, and hence,
improves communication secrecy. However, estimating the residual self-
interference at the central controller (e.g., the macro BS), which is responsible
for resource allocation, may not be possible. Hence, we make the worst-case
assumption of zero self-interference in this paper and the obtained results
provide a lower bound on the performance for the case of imperfect self-
interference cancellation.
6QoS and secrecy constraints. Note that low transmit power
is desirable to minimize the interference caused in other
cells and to reduce the network operation cost. For a given
cache status, the cooperative transmission decisions for each
time slot are optimized online based on instantaneous CSI
estimates. However, due to time causality and computational
complexity constraints, the cache placement for each period
is optimized offline based on historical user requests and CSI
[10], [16].
A. Channel State Information
At the beginning of each time slot, the CSI hρ,t andGj,t has
to be acquired5 at the centralized controller, i.e., the macro BS,
for computing the resource allocation. The estimates of hρ,t
and Gj,t gathered at the macro BS, denoted by ĥρ,t ∈ CN×1
and Ĝj,t ∈ CN×Nj , respectively, will in general be imperfect.
That is, the actual channels are given by hρ,t = ĥρ,t+∆hρ,t
and Gj,t = Ĝj,t +∆Gj,t, where ∆hρ,t and ∆Gj,t represent
the respective channel estimation errors caused by quantization
errors, imperfect feedback channels, as well as outdated and
noisy estimates. In fact, the estimation errors∆hρ,t and∆Gj,t
may be enhanced by the actions of the untrusted BSs which
may not fully cooperate with the macro BS during channel
estimation and feedback.
The specific values of ∆hρ,t and ∆Gj,t are not known
at the macro BS. To model the imperfect CSI, we assume
that the possible values of ∆hρ,t and ∆Gj,t lie in ellipsoidal
uncertainty regions [42] given by
Ωρ,t ,
{
∆hρ,t ∈ CN×1 | ∆hHρ,tΞρ∆hρ,t ≤ ε2ρ
}
,
ρ ∈ S, t ∈ T0, (13)
Ωj,t ,
{
∆Gj,t ∈ CN×Nj | tr
(
∆GHj,tΞj∆Gj,t
) ≤ ε2j},
j ∈MU , t ∈ T0. (14)
Here, ερ > 0 and εj > 0 represent the radii of uncer-
tainty regions Ωρ,t and Ωj,t, respectively; Ξρ ∈ CN×N and
Ξj ∈ CN×N denote the orientations of the uncertainty regions,
respectively, where Ξρ ≻ 0 and Ξj ≻ 0. In practice, the
values of ερ, εj , Ξρ, and Ξj depend on the channel coherence
time and the adopted channel estimation methods.
B. Caching Optimization
Let q , [q1,0,0, . . . , qf,l,m, . . . , qF,L−1,M ] and wρ,t ,
[wHρ,0,t, . . . ,w
H
ρ,Lρ−1,t
]H be the caching and the transmitter
beamforming optimization vectors, respectively. Considering
the two-timescale control in Fig. 1(b), the caching decision
q is made (at the end of) every T0 time slots based on the
historical profiles of user requests and CSI that have been
5For example, by exploiting channel reciprocity in time division duplex
systems, hρ,t and Gj,t can be estimated in the uplink at the small cell
and macro BSs based on pilots emitted by the UEs and the untrusted BSs,
respectively. Then, the estimated CSI obtained at the small cell BSs is fed
back to the macro BS via the X2 interface [53].
collected during the time period6. For the considered typical
period T0, the caching optimization problem is formulated as:
P0: minimize
q,wρ,t,Vt
∑
t∈T0
UTP (q,wρ,t,Vt) (15)
subject to C1, C2, C3, C4: Vt  0, ΛUVt = 0,
C5: tr
Λm
∑
ρ,l
wρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,t+Vt
≤Pmaxm ,
C6: min
∆hρ,t∈Ωρ,t
Rρ,l,t ≥ Rreqρ,l, ρ ∈ S, l ∈ Lρ,
C7: max
j∈MU
max
∆Gj,t∈Ωj,t
Rj,ρ,0,t ≤ Rtolρ,0, ρ ∈ S,
where UTP (q,wρ,t,Vt) ,
tr
(∑
m∈MΛm
(∑
ρ∈S
∑
l∈Lρ
wρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,t +Vt
))
denotes
the total BS transmit power in time slot t ∈ T0. Constraint C5
limits the maximal transmit power of BS m ∈ M to Pmaxm .
C6 guarantees the minimum video delivery rate, Rreqρ,l, in each
time slot t ∈ T0 to provide QoS in delivering layer l ∈ Lρ
for serving request ρ ∈ S. C7 constrains the maximum
data rate leaked to the untrusted BSs in set MU to Rtolρ,0
in each time slot t to ensure communication secrecy. Since
the untrusted BSs are unable to decode the enhancement
layers without base-layer information, secrecy can be ensured
by imposing C7 only on the delivery of the base-layer
subfiles. Due to the imperfect CSI, the minimum/maximum
data rate in C6/C7 is guaranteed/constrained for all possible
estimation error vectors/matrices in the respective uncertainty
sets in order to facilitate robustness with respect to (w.r.t.)
communication secrecy. This robust optimization approach
has been commonly adopted for studying PLS in the
literature, see [29]–[31] and references therein. Constraints
C6 and C7 jointly guarantee a minimum achievable secrecy
rate of Rsecρ,0,t =
[
R
req
ρ,0 −Rtolρ,0
]+
, t ∈ T0, for delivering the
base-layer subfiles for request ρ, provided that problem P0 is
feasible.
Problem P0 is a non-convex mixed-integer nonlinear pro-
gram (MINLP)7 due to the binary caching decision vector
q and the non-convex constraints C6 and C7. This type of
problem is NP-hard [41]. Yet, since P0 is solved offline for
a large timescale, we adopt a global optimization method to
solve P0 optimally in Section IV-A. The obtained solution de-
fines a performance benchmark for low-complexity suboptimal
schemes, cf. Section IV-B.
C. Delivery Optimization
Assume that the instantaneous CSI estimates are given.
Moreover, the cache status q for T0 has been determined at
the end of the previous time period. Then, the cooperative
transmission policy {wρ,t,Vt} for time t ∈ T0 is optimized
online by solving the following problem
6Prediction of the users’ future requests based on historical user profiles can
further improve the cache placement at the cost of an increased computational
complexity.
7For a non-convex MINLP, even if the binary constraints are relaxed into
convex ones, the problem remains non-convex [41].
7Q0: minimize
wρ,t,Vt
UTP (q,wρ,t,Vt) (16)
subject to C3, C4, C5, C6, C7.
Problem Q0 is non-convex due to constraints C6 and C7.
However, we will show that Q0 can be optimally solved by
employing SDP relaxation, cf. Section IV-C.
IV. PROBLEM SOLUTION
In this section, the caching problem P0 is tackled first. We
show that P0 can be transformed into a convex MINLP by
SDP relaxation and further solved optimally by an iterative
algorithm. Inspired by the optimal algorithm, a low-complexity
suboptimal caching scheme is developed to balance between
optimality and computational complexity. Moreover, we show
that the delivery problem Q0 can be optimally and efficiently
solved.
A. Optimal Caching Scheme
1) Problem Transformation: To reformulate problem P0
as a convex MINLP, C6 and C7 have to be transformed
into convex constraints. Let Wρ,l,t = wρ,l,tw
H
ρ,l,t  0 be
the beamforming matrix subject to rank (Wρ,l,t) ≤ 1. By
substituting Wρ,l,t and employing elementary arithmetic op-
erations, C6 is equivalently reformulated as an affine inequality
constraint that is jointly convex w.r.t. {Wρ,l,t,Vt},
C6: hHρ,tTρ,l,thρ,t ≥ σ2, ∀∆hρ,t ∈ Ωρ,t, (17)
where Tρ,l,t ,
1
ηreq
ρ,l
Wρ,l,t−
∑
(ρ′,l′) 6=(ρ,l) a
ρ′,l′
ρ,l Wρ′,l′,t−Vt
and ηreqρ,l , 2
Rreq
ρ,l−1. However, as Ωρ,t is a continuous set, C6
is semi-infinite, i.e., it represents infinitely many inequalities
for Tρ,l,t, and hence, is still intractable for optimization. To
overcome this issue, C6 is transformed into a finite number of
convex constraints. To this end, we substitute hρ,t = ĥρ,t +
∆hρ,t in C6 and apply the S-procedure from [43, Appendix
B], which leads to
C6: ∆hHρ,tTρ,l,t∆hρ,t + 2ℜ
{
ĥHρ,tTρ,l,t∆hρ,t
}
+ ĥHρ,tTρ,l,tĥρ,t − σ2 ≥ 0, ∀∆hρ,t ∈ Ωρ,t,
⇐⇒ C˜6: UHρ,tTρ,l,tUρ,t [
−δρ,l,tΞρ 0
0H σ2 + δρ,l,tε
2
ρ
]
, δρ,l,t ≥ 0, (18)
where Uρ,t , [IN , ĥρ,t] ∈ C(N+1)×(N+1) and δρ,l,t is an
auxiliary optimization variable.
Next, let Wρ,l,j,t = (1 − qf(ρ),l,j)Wρ,l,t  0 be an
auxiliary optimization matrix. We have
Ψj,ρ,l,t = G
H
j,t
( ∑
(ρ′,l′) 6=(ρ,l)
aρ
′,l′
ρ,l Wρ′,l′,j,t
)
Gj,t, (19)
if and only if rank(Wρ,l,j,t) ≤ 1 and the following constraints
hold,
C8: tr(Wρ,l,t −Wρ,l,j,t)  qf(ρ),l,jPmax,
C9: tr(Wρ,l,j,t)  (1− qf(ρ),l,j)Pmax,
C10:Wρ,l,t Wρ,l,j,t, Wρ,l,j,t  0,
(20)
where Pmax ,
∑
m∈M P
max
m . Here, C8 and C9 guarantee
that Wρ,l,j,t = 0 if qf(ρ),l,j = 1, and Wρ,l,j,t = Wρ,l,t
otherwise. By substituting Wρ,l,j,t and Ψj,ρ,l,t, C7 can be
reformulated into an LMI as follows
C7 ⇐⇒ 1
σ2j
wHρ,0,tGj,tZ
−1
j,ρ,0,tG
H
j,twρ,0,t ≤ ηtotρ,0
⇐⇒ tr (Z−1j,ρ,0,tGHj,tWρ,0,tGj,t) ≤ σ2j ηtotρ,0,
(a)⇐⇒ λmax
(
Z
−1/2
j,ρ,0,tG
H
j,tWρ,0,tGj,tZ
−1/2
j,ρ,0
)
≤ σ2j ηtotρ,0,
⇐⇒ C7: GHj,tTρ,0,j,tGj,t  σ2j INj , ∀j ∈ MU ,
∀∆Gj,t ∈ Ωj,t, (21)
where ηtotρ,0 , 2
Rtot
ρ,0 − 1, Tρ,0,j,t , 1ηtot
ρ,0
Wρ,0,t −∑
(ρ′,l′) 6=(ρ,0) a
ρ′,l′
ρ,0 Wρ′,l′,j,t − Vt, and (a) holds due to
rank(Wρ,l,t) ≤ 1. In fact, as Ωj,t is a continuous set,
C7 in (21) represents infinitely many LMIs that are jointly
convex w.r.t.
{
Wρ,0,t,Vt,Wj,t
}
. For tractability, C7 has to
be transformed into a finite number of convex constraints. This
can be accomplished by exploiting the robust quadratic matrix
inequality in [45, Theorem 3.3]. Thereby, we obtain
C7 ⇐⇒ C˜7: UHj,tTρ,0,j,tUj,t [
(σ2j − δρ,0,j,t)INj 0
0
δρ,0,j,t
ε2j
Ξj
]
, δρ,0,j,t ≥ 0, (22)
where Uj,t , [Ĝj,tIN ] ∈ CN×(N+Nj) and δρ,0,j,t is an
auxiliary optimization variable.
Finally, by defining the delivery variable Dt ,
[Wρ,l,t,Wρ,l,j,t,Vt] and applying the above transformations,
the original problem P0 is equivalently reformulated as
minimize
q,Dt
∑
t∈T0
UTP (q,Dt) (23)
subject to C1, C2, C4, C˜6, C˜7, C8, C9, C10,
C3: tr(ΛmWρ,l,t) ≤ qf(ρ),l,mPmaxm ,
C5: tr
(
Λm
(∑
ρ,l
Wρ,l,t +Vt
))
≤ Pmaxm ,
C11: rank(Wρ,l,t) ≤ 1, ρ ∈ S, l ∈ Lρ.
Here, constraint rank(Wρ,l,t) ≤ 1 is dropped due to C10
and C11. Let P1 denote the SDP relaxation of problem (23),
obtained by dropping C11 in (23). Then, problem P1 is a
convex MINLP, i.e., by relaxing the binary constraints of P1
into convex ones, we arrive at a convex problem.
The GBD algorithm is a simple iterative method to handle
convex MINLPs [41, Section 6.3]. In each GBD iteration,
upper and lower bounds on the optimal value are generated
by solving a primal subproblem and a master problem, respec-
tively. To ensure convergence, optimality and feasibility cuts
are successively added to tighten the bounds and eliminate
the infeasible solutions possibly obtained during the iterations,
respectively. The GBD algorithm is attractive for solving P1
as it can be efficiently implemented exploiting the structure of
P1. In particular, the resulting primal subproblem is a convex
problem where strong duality holds while the master problem
is a mixed-integer linear program (MILP), and both problems
are easy to handle using off-the-shelf numerical solvers such
8as CVX [46] and MOSEK [47]. However, the GBD algorithm
typically suffers from slow convergence. This is because, when
an infeasible solution is obtained in an iteration of the GBD,
the resulting feasibility cut is usually ineffective in improving
the solution. If the problem is infeasible, the GBD algorithm
terminates only after having performed an exhaustive search
over all possible candidate solutions. To remedy this issue, an
improved GBD algorithm8 is proposed below.
2) Problem Decomposition: The proposed modified GBD
algorithm applies a two-layer decomposition of problem P1
and solves a binary caching optimization problem for q in the
outer layer and a continuous delivery optimization problem
for Dt in the inner layer. However, q and Dt are coupled via
constraints C3, C8, and C9. To facilitate the decomposition, we
perturb the right-hand sides of C3, C8, and C9 by introducing
slack variables sC3ρ,l,m,t ≥ 0, sC8ρ,l,j,t ≥ 0, and sC9ρ,l,j,t ≥ 0,
respectively. Let st , [s
C3
ρ,l,m,t, s
C8
ρ,l,j,t, s
C9
ρ,l,j,t] be the pertur-
bation vector and st  0. Moreover, in the objective function,
we add an ℓ1-norm (exact) penalty cost function for st,
fPen(st),µ
∑
ρ,l,m
sC3ρ,l,m,t +
∑
ρ,l,j
(
sC8ρ,l,j,t + s
C9
ρ,l,j,t
) , (24)
with penalty factor µ≫ 1. Consequently, problem P1 decom-
poses into T0 SDP subproblems in the inner layer, i.e., one
subproblem for each time slot t ∈ T0, and an MILP in the
outer layer, which are shown in (25) and (26) at the top of the
next page, respectively. Problem (26) is referred as the master
problem. Thereby, problems (25) and (26) are equivalent to
P1 when µ≫ 1, as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For µ ≫ 1, problems P1 and (25), (26) are
equivalent such that: i) if P1 is feasible, then SDP subproblem
(25) is always feasible for q ∈ Q; moreover, the optimal
solution of q for P1 solves the master problem (26); ii) if
problem (25) is infeasible, i.e., ν (q) = +∞, or its optimal
solution satisfies st′ 6= 0 for some t′ ∈ T0, then problem P1
is infeasible.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Remark 2. By perturbation, the feasible set of ν (q) in (25),
(26) is extended to Q ⊆ {0, 1}F×L×M . Consequently, based
on Proposition 1, infeasible solutions can be avoided if prob-
lem P1 is feasible, cf. i), or identified easily if problem P1 is
infeasible, cf. ii). These properties facilitate an efficient im-
plementation of the GBD algorithm in the sequel to optimally
solve (25) and (26).
SDP subproblem (25) is convex and can be solved by inte-
rior point methods [43], [48], i.e., numerical solvers such as
CVX [46] are applicable. Meanwhile, exploiting the convexity
(and strong duality) of (25), we can further simplify the formu-
lation of the master problem (26). Let λC3ρ,l,m,t ≥ 0, λC8ρ,l,j,t ≥
0, and λC9ρ,l,j,t ≥ 0 be the Lagrange multipliers for C3, C8, and
C9, respectively, and define λt, [λ
C3
ρ,l,m,t, λ
C8
ρ,l,j,t, λ
C9
ρ,l,j,t]0.
The Lagrangian of (25) can be written as
8A similar approach as in the proposed improved GBD algorithm has been
successfully applied to accelerate the outer approximation algorithm in [41,
Section 6.6].
Lq (Dt, st;λt) = f1 (q;λt) + f2 (Dt, st;λt) , (27)
where f1 (q;λt) =
∑
ρ,l,j
(
λC9ρ,l,j,t − λC8ρ,l,j,t
)
qf(ρ),l,jPmax −∑
ρ,l,m,t λ
C3
ρ,l,m,tqf(ρ),l,mP
max
m , and
f2 (Dt, st;λt) = fPen (st)+∑
ρ,l
tr
[∑
m
λC3ρ,l,m,tΛm +
(
1 +
∑
j
λC8ρ,l,j,t
)
IN
]
Wρ,l,t
+
∑
ρ,l,j
(
λC9ρ,l,j,t − λC8ρ,l,j,t
)
tr
(
Wρ,l,j,t
)−∑
ρ,l,j
λC9ρ,l,j,tPmax
−
∑
ρ,l,m
λC3ρ,l,m,ts
C3
ρ,l,m,t +
∑
ρ,l,j
(
λC8ρ,l,j,ts
C8
ρ,l,j,t − λC9ρ,l,j,tsC9ρ,l,j,t
)
.
Lq (Dt, st;λt) is separable w.r.t. {q} and {Dt, st}. Since,
for given q ∈ Q, problem (25) is convex and fulfills Slater’s
condition, the following result holds due to strong duality:
νt (q) = max
λt0
min
Dt∈Dt, st0
Lq (Dt, st;λt) , ∀q ∈ Q. (28)
Consequently, the master problem is reformulated as
minimize
q∈Q,α
α (29)
subject to α ≥
∑
t∈T0
ξt (q;λt) , ∀λt  0,
where ξt (q;λt) , minDt∈Dt, st0 Lq (Dt, st;λt). Although
problem (29) still contains an infinite number of constraints
(w.r.t. λt) and undetermined functions ξt(·; ·), it is readily
solvable by an iterative relaxation method as will be explained
in the following.
3) Optimal Iterative Solution: The proposed iterative algo-
rithm is given in Algorithm 1. Let k be the iteration index.
We start from one constraint at k = 1, which defines a cutting
plane (also referred as an optimality cut [41]). Then, the
number of constraints/cuts are increased sequentially as the
iteration proceeds. Specifically, for given dual variables λ
j
t ,
j = 1, . . . k − 1, the following master problem is solved in
iteration k,
minimize
q∈Q,α
α (30)
subject to α ≥
∑
t∈T0
ξt
(
q;λjt
)
, j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Problem (30) is a relaxation of problem (29). Due to the
enlarged feasible set, the optimal value of problem (30)
gives a lower bound on that of problem (29). The relaxation
solution, denoted by (qk, αk), is optimal for problem (29)
if it is feasible for problem (29). Otherwise, we add another
optimality cut to the feasible set of (30) in the next iteration
to tighten the relaxation. As this process continues, we obtain
a non-decreasing sequence of lower bounds until the relaxed
solution becomes feasible, i.e., solves problem (29) optimally,
or until the problem is known to be infeasible.
Two remarks regarding Algorithm 1 are in order. First, as
can be observed in Algorithm 1 (lines 5–10), the feasibility
or optimality of qk is verified by solving SDP subproblem
(25). This is because, if qk is optimal, we know that solving
problem (25) for q = qk in line 5 will return the optimal
value of αk , i.e., ν(qk) = αk, owing to the strong duality of
problem (25). Otherwise, ν(qk) gives an upper bound on the
optimal value, and thus, ν(qk) ≥ αk. By keeping the lowest
upper bound obtained so far, i.e., UB ← min{UB, ν(qk)}
9νt (q) , minimize
Dt,st0
UTP(q,Dt) + fPen(st) (25)
subject to Dt∈Dt,
{
Dt |C4, C5, C6, C7, C10
}
, C3: tr(ΛmWρ,l,t)−qf(ρ),l,mPmaxm ≤sC3ρ,l,m,
C8: tr(Wρ,l,t −Wρ,l,j,t)− qf(ρ),l,jPmax ≤ sC8ρ,l,j , C9: tr(Wρ,l,j,t)− (1− qf(ρ),l,j)Pmax ≤ sC9ρ,l,j ,
minimize
q,α
α (26)
subject to α ≥ ν (q) ,
∑
t∈T0
νt (q) , q ∈ Q , {q | C1, C2} .
Algorithm 1 Optimal iterative algorithm for solving P1 and
P0
1: Initialization: Given q0 ← 0. Solve the SDP subproblem (25)
for given q0 and determine D1t , s
1
t ,λ
1
t ; set tolerance ε ≥ 0,
UB ← ν(q0), LB ←−∞, k ← 1;
2: while (UB > LB + ε) do
3: Solve the relaxed master problem (30) for given Dkt , s
k
t , λ
k
t
and determine the solution (qk, αk);
4: Update lower bound and solution: LB ← αk, q∗ ← qk;
5: Solve SDP subproblem (25) for given qk and determine the
primal and the dual solutions Dk+1t , s
k+1
t , λ
k+1
t ;
6: if (ν(qk) = +∞, i.e., (25) is infeasible, OR ν(qk) ≤ αk+ε)
then
7: Set D∗t ← D
k+1
t , s
∗
t ← s
k+1
t and exit the while loop;
8: else if (ν(qk) < UB) then
9: Update upper bound and solution: UB ← ν(qk), D∗t ←
D
k+1
t , s
∗
t ← s
k+1
t ;
10: end if
11: Update iteration index: k ← k + 1;
12: end while
13: if (s∗t = 0) then
14: Return the optimal solutions q∗ and D∗t ;
15: else
16: Return the infeasible problem P0/P1.
17: end if
(cf. line 9), the optimality condition is satisfied when the gap
between UB and the lower bound vanishes.
Second, for computational convenience, the values of λkt
in iteration k can be intelligently chosen as the optimal dual
solutions of problem (28) or (25) for q = qk in line 5. In this
case, the constraint function ξt(·; ·) can be easily computed as
explained in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let (Dkt , s
k
t ) and λ
k
t be the optimal primal and
dual solutions of (25) for ν(qk) at iteration k, respectively.
Then, we have i) (Dkt , s
k
t ) also solves the minimization
problem in the optimality cut of iteration k + 1 (cf. (30)),
i.e., (Dkt , s
k
t ) ∈ argminDt∈Dt, st≥0 Lq(Dt, st;λkt ).
ii) By choosing λt = λ
k
t , function ξt
(
q;λkt
)
reduces to
an affine function given by
ξt
(
q;λkt
)
=
∑
ρ,l,j
(
λC9,kρ,l,j,t − λC8,kρ,l,j,t
)
Pmax
(
qf(ρ),l,j − qkf(ρ),l,j
)
−
∑
ρ,l,m
λC3,kρ,l,m,tP
max
m
(
qf(ρ),l,m − qkf(ρ),l,m
)
+ UTP
(
qk,Dkt
)
+ fPen
(
skt
)
. (31)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Based on Proposition 2, the relaxed master problem (30) is
an MILP and can be solved optimally, e.g., using the numerical
solver MOSEK [47]. Similar to the conventional GBD method,
Algorithm 1 converges in a finite number of iterations as
shown in Proposition 3. The obtained solution is globally
optimal for problem P1. In general, the solution of P1 gives a
lower bound for problem P0. However, by inspecting the rank
of the SDP solution of problem P1, we can further show that
the SDP relaxation is tight.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 1 converges in a finite number
iterations. Moreover, assuming that the channel vectors ĥρ,t,
ρ ∈ S, can be modeled as statistically independent random
vectors, problems P1 and P0 are equivalent in the sense
that whenever P0 is feasible, the solution of P1 is also
(globally) optimal for P0 with probability one, and the optimal
beamformer is given by the principal eigenvector of Wρ,l,t.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Due to perturbation, only optimality cuts, cf. (30), need to be
generated by Algorithm 1 in each iteration, cf. Remark 2. This
is different from the classical GBD algorithm [41, Section 6.3]
where feasibility cuts are also required to exclude infeasible
solutions during intermediate iterations. Since the optimality
cuts can successively improve the lower bounds, Algorithm 1
is expected to converge faster than the classic GBD algorithm
if P1 is feasible. On the other hand, even if P1 is infeasible,
the perturbed problem is generally feasible. Then, optimality
cuts can be still generated to iteratively improve the solutions
and reduce the required number of iterations with a high
probability.
4) Computational Complexity: Assume that the interior-
point method [43], [48] is applied to solve the SDP subprob-
lems in each iteration of the GBD algorithm. The computa-
tional complexity of solving each SDP subproblem w.r.t. the
number of UEs, K , the number of BSs, M , the number of
BS antennas, N , and the number of SVC layers, L, can be
approximated as [49, Theorem 3.12]
Θsdp = O
((
(MKL)
4 (
N3 +N2 + 2
)
+ (MKL)
3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Complexity per iteration
×
√
MKLN log
(
ǫ−1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Number of iterations
)
= O
(
(MKL)
4.5
N3.5 log
(
ǫ−1
))
, (32)
where ǫ>0 is the solution accuracy specified by the numerical
solver and O(·) is the big-O notation. Although the SDP
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Algorithm 2 Suboptimal iterative algorithm for solving P1
and P0
1: Initialization: Given q1m ← 0, ∀m ∈ M; k ← 1;
2: while Ik 6= ∅ do
3: for each i ∈ Ik do
4: Solve SDP subproblem (25) for each given {qm} satisfying
qi ∈ Q
k
i ∩Q;
5: Determine qk+1i in (34);
6: end for
7: k ← k + 1.
8: end while
subproblems can be solved in polynomial time in line 5, cf.
(32), the overall computational complexity of Algorithm 1
grows non-polynomially with the size of problem P0. This is
because the MILP solver in line 3 may incur an exponential-
time computational complexity, O(2FLM ), in the worst case
[41], even though the likelihood that the worst case occurs is
low due to the employed perturbation, cf. Remark 2. Thus,
only offline cache optimization may be feasible in practical
implementations.
B. Suboptimal Caching Scheme
For systems with limited computing resources, Algorithm 1
may not be applicable due to its worst-case exponential-time
computational complexity. Instead, polynomial-time subopti-
mal schemes facilitating a better trade-off between system
performance and computational complexity may be preferable.
Based on Proposition 3, P0 can be solved via its equivalent
convex MINLP, P1. As is also evident from (25), for given
q, P1 reduces to an SDP and can be solved optimally in
polynomial time, cf. (32). Therefore, by additionally adjusting
q via a greedy iterative search, we obtain the low-complexity
suboptimal scheme in Algorithm 2.
Let FS and qm be the set of files requested by S (the set of
requests) and the caching vector at BS m, respectively, where
FS ⊆ F . We define
Qkm ,
{
qm ∈ {0, 1}|FS |×L |
∥∥qm − qkm∥∥22 ≤ 1} (33)
as the set of binary vectors within a distance of one from
qkm. Besides, Ik ,
{
m ∈ M | ∣∣Qkm ∩ Q∣∣ > 1} defines
the set of BS indices where Qkm and Q have non-unique
intersection points. During iteration k, the vector in set Qki ∩Q
that minimizes the objective value of primal problem (25) is
chosen as the new caching vector at BS i ∈ Ik, i.e.,
qk+1i = argmin
qi∈Qki ∩Q
ν (q1, . . . ,qM ) . (34)
That is, the cache vectors qk+1i , within a distance of one from
qki , are iteratively updated to successively reduce the objective
value. The iteration continues until Qki ∩ Q becomes unique,
i.e., no further reduction in the objective function is possible,
which yields the solution. Hence, the number of problem
instances of (25) to be solved is bounded byML2 |FS |2. Con-
sequently, the overall computational complexity of Algorithm
2 is approximated as O
(
ML2 |FS |2Θsdp
)
, which grows only
polynomially with the problem size.
Remark 3. By adopting the greedy heuristic, searching over
the non-convex set Q of P1 can be done in polynomial
time. The obtained solution is ensured to be feasible for
P1. Moreover, it is often close-to-optimal due to the iterative
minimization in (34) [50], as will be shown in Section V.
C. Optimal Delivery Solution
By applying the same transformation techniques as for
problem P0 in Section IV-A and relaxing the rank constraint,
cf. C11, problem Q0 can be reformulated as an SDP, which
is equivalent to problem (25). Since, based on Proposition 3,
the solution of problem (25) fulfills rank constraint C11 with
probability one, delivery problem Q0 can be solved optimally
via SDP subproblem (25), as stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. SDP subproblem (25) (for the respective in-
stantaneous CSI) and the delivery optimization problem Q0
are equivalent in the sense that the solution of (25) is also
optimal for Q0 whenever Q0 is feasible.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Propositions 1 and
3 and is omitted for brevity.
Therefore, delivery optimization problem Q0 can be solved
in polynomial time with computational complexity Θsdp,
cf. (32), which is desirable for online implementation [42].
Moreover, delivery optimization incurs a signaling overhead
of O(MKLN) for collecting the CSI at the macro BS and
distributing the optimization results to the small cell BSs.
Remark 4. Although the total number of BSs in dense small
cell networks may be large [44], the coverage areas of most
small cell BSs will not overlap. Therefore, the proposed
caching and delivery algorithms may be applied to several
small groups of small cell BSs with overlapping coverage
areas rather than jointly to all small cell BSs. This considerably
reduces the computational complexity and signaling overhead.
Remark 5. The proposed caching and delivery optimization
framework can be extended to integrate (centralized and
decentralized) coded caching at the end users [11]–[15]. For
example, multicast codewords can be cooperatively transmit-
ted by a subset of the BSs if these BSs have cached the
subfiles required for coded multicast transmission. Such a
design reaps the performance gains of both coded caching and
cache-enabled cooperative MIMO transmission. However, the
resulting cache optimization problem would involve a large
number of binary caching variables, which have to be defined
per subfile, and SDP relaxation of the delivery optimization
problem may not yield the optimal solution anymore [51].
Hence, extending the proposed framework to coded caching
is an interesting topic for future research.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
optimal and suboptimal schemes. Consider a cell of radius
R1 = 1 km, where the macro BS is located at the center
of the cell and three small cell BSs are uniformly distributed
within the cell. The number of untrusted small cell BSs is
set to Mu , |MU | = 1, unless stated otherwise. To gain
insight, in Figs. 2–5, we consider a small network with only
three small cell BSs. A larger network is considered in Fig. 6.
The macro BS is equipped with N0 = 6 antennas while each
small cell BS has Nm = 2 antennas. We assume that F =10
video files, each of duration 45 minutes and size 500 MB
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TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Parameters Settings
System bandwidth 5 MHz
Duration of time slot 10 ms
Duration of delivery period 45 mins
Macro BS transmit power Pmax0 = 46 dBm
Small BS transmit power Pmaxm = 39 dBm
Noise power density −172.6 dBm/Hz
Cache capacity at macro BS Cmax0 = 1000 MB
(Bytes), are delivered to K = 6 single-antenna UEs. Each
user requests the files independent of the other users. Let
θ = [θ1, . . . , θF ] be the probability distribution of the requests
for different files. We set θ according to a Zipf distribution
with γ = 1.1. In particular, assuming that file f ∈ F is the
σf th most popular file for the UEs, the probability of file f ∈F
being requested is given by θf =
1
σγ
f
/
∑
f∈F
1
σγ
f
[52]. We adopt
an SVC codec with L=2. That is, each video file is encoded
into a base-layer subfile (l = 0) and an enhancement-layer
subfile (l = 1), each of size Vf,l = 250 MB. The minimum
streaming rate and the secrecy rate threshold for the base-layer
subfiles are Rreqρ,0=825 kbps and R
tol
ρ,0=0.1R
req
ρ,0=82.5 kbps,
respectively. Therefore, if problem Q0 is feasible, a secrecy
streaming rate of Rsecρ,0,t = 742.5 kbps can be guaranteed
for secure and uninterrupted video streaming for each user as
Rsecρ,0,t≥250×8×106/(45×60)=741 kbps. The streaming rate of
the enhancement-layer subfiles is Rreqρ,1=2R
sec
ρ,0,t=1.5 Mbps.
The users are randomly distributed in the system. Based on
the locations of the BSs and users, the path loss is calculated
using the 3GPP model for the “urban macro non-line-of-sight”
scenario [53]. The small-scale fading coefficients are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh random
variables. We employ Euclidean spheres for modeling the
uncertainty regions Ωρ,t and Ωj,t by setting Ξρ = Ξj = IN .
Meanwhile, we define the maximum normalized channel es-
timation error variances of hρ,t and Gj,t as σ
2
ρ =
ε2
ρ
‖hρ,t‖
2
2
and σ2j =
ε2j
‖Gj,t‖
2
F
, respectively. Unless otherwise specified,
we assume σ2ρ = 0.01, ρ ∈ S and σ2j = 0.05, j ∈ MU . All
other relevant system parameters are given in Table II.
For comparison, we consider two heuristic caching schemes
and a non-cooperative and a non-robust delivery scheme as
baselines:
• Baseline 1 (Random caching): The video (sub)files are
randomly cached until the cache capacity is reached.
• Baseline 2 (Preference based caching): The most popular
(sub)files are cached. In trusted BSs, since the base-layer
subfiles are more important, they are cached with higher
priority than the enhancement-layer subfiles of the same
video file. For Baselines 1 and 2, the optimal delivery
decisions are obtained by solving problem Q0.
• Baseline 3 (No cooperation with untrusted BSs): No
video files are cached at the untrusted BSs, which act
as pure eavesdroppers. Hence, the untrusted BSs are not
allowed to cooperate for delivery of the video files. This
approach is adopted in state-of-the-art cellular networks.
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Fig. 2. (a) Total BS transmit power and (b) secrecy outage probability
versus cache capacity for different caching and delivery schemes.
The optimal caching and delivery decisions are obtained
from problems P0 and Q0, respectively, with Cmaxm = 0,
∀m ∈MU .
• Baseline 4 (Non-robust transmission): Different from
the proposed schemes, the macro BS treats the channel
estimates ĥρ,t and Ĝj,t as accurate. The optimal caching
and delivery decisions are obtained by solving problems
P0 and Q0, respectively, after setting hρ,t = ĥρ,t and
Gj,t = Ĝj,t.
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the performance of the consid-
ered caching and delivery schemes as functions of the cache
capacity. Herein, the system performance is evaluated during
the online delivery of the video files, cf. problem Q0. The se-
crecy outage probability, defined as pout , Pr
(∑
ρR
sec
ρ,0,t <∑
ρ
[
Rreqρ,0 −Rtolρ,0
]+ )
, characterizes the likelihood that prob-
lem Q0 is infeasible because either the QoS constraint C6
or the secrecy constraint C7 cannot be satisfied. As can be
observed from Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), for all considered schemes,
a larger cache capacity leads to both a lower total BS transmit
power and a smaller secrecy outage probability as larger virtual
transmit antenna arrays can be formed among the trusted and
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Fig. 3. Average number of cooperating BSs versus cache capacity for
transmission of the base-layer and enhancement-layer subfiles when
Algorithm 1 is employed for cache optimization.
untrusted BSs for cooperative beamforming transmission of
the base-layer and enhancement-layer subfiles, respectively.
There is a non-negligible performance gap between the op-
timal scheme and Baseline 3, particularly in the high cache
capacity regime. This is because the proposed caching scheme
can exploit the cache resources of the untrusted helpers for
delivering enhancement-layer subfiles while Baseline 3 cannot.
The performance gap between the proposed optimal scheme
and Baselines 1 and 2 is small for small (large) cache
capacities because of insufficient (saturated) BS cooperation.
For medium cache capacities, however, the proposed optimal
scheme achieves considerable performance gains due to its
ability to exploit information regarding the user requests
and CSI for cache placement. We note that the proposed
suboptimal scheme attains good performance in all regimes
despite its low computational cost.
To provide more insight into how the BSs cooperate,
Fig. 3 shows the average numbers of cooperating (small
cell and macro) BSs for transmission of the base-layer and
enhancement-layer subfiles, denoted as NBL and NEL, re-
spectively, if Algorithm 1 is employed for cache optimization.
Recall that the proposed caching scheme does not cache
base-layer subfiles at untrusted BSs, cf. constraint C1. Con-
sequently, for a given cache capacity, NBL ≤ NEL holds.
Interestingly, the behavior of NBL and NEL is not monotonic
as the cache capacity increases. In the small and medium cache
capacity regime, NBL and NEL monotonically increase with
the cache capacity since the number of subfiles that can be
cached at the small cell BSs and the number of BSs that can
participate in cooperative transmission increase. For example,
NBL and NEL are 0.5 and 0.7 for 300 MB cache capacity
per small cell BS, respectively, and increase to 1.7 and 2.7
for 1200 MB cache capacity per small cell BS, respectively.
In the large cache capacity regime, the performance gains
saturate as the available DoFs for the transmission of the
base-layer and enhancement-layer subfiles saturate, cf. Fig. 2.
However, NBL and NEL decrease by 1 before reaching the
stationary BS cooperation topology. This is because, when the
cache-enabled DoFs are sufficient, the optimal caching scheme
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Fig. 4. (a) Total BS transmit power and (b) secrecy outage probability
versus normalized channel estimation error variance for the proposed
optimal scheme (solid line), the suboptimal scheme (dotted line), and
Baseline 4 (dashed line).
selects preferred trusted cooperating (small cell and/or macro)
BSs, e.g., based on their channel conditions and cache status,
instead of exploiting all BSs available for cooperation.
Next, we evaluate the robustness of the proposed schemes
w.r.t. channel estimation errors. Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) show
the performance of the proposed schemes and Baseline 4 as
functions of the normalized channel estimation error variances,
σ2j , where Cmax denotes the cache capacity per small cell
BS. We observe that, compared to Baseline 4, the proposed
schemes achieve a lower secrecy outage probability at the cost
of a slightly higher transmit power consumption. Specifically,
to achieve robustness in meeting QoS constraint C6 under
imperfect CSI, the proposed schemes employ wide beams for
transmitting the base-layer subfiles, which may lead to infor-
mation leakage to the untrusted BSs. Hence, to ensure commu-
nication secrecy in constraint C7, the proposed schemes also
have to transmit a non-negligible amount of AN to degrade
the reception of the untrusted BSs. On the other hand, the
wide beams and the interference caused by the AN to the
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legitimate users, cf. (7), have to be compensated by increasing
the transmit power of the beamforming vectors. Therefore, the
total transmit power increases as the CSI uncertainty increases.
In contrast, by treating the imperfect CSI as perfect in C6,
Baseline 4 employs narrow transmit beams to save transmit
power but this leads to the highest secrecy outage probability
in Fig. 4(b).
The impact of the number of trusted and untrusted BSs
on cache-enabled secrecy is studied in Figs. 5(a) and 5(b).
Fig. 5(a) reveals that the required transmit power increases
with the number of untrusted BSs Mu, if the total number of
BSs is kept constant. This is because, as more helpers become
untrusted, fewer (trusted) BSs are available for cooperative
transmission of the base-layer subfiles and, at the same time,
the trusted BSs have to transmit a larger amount of AN
to combat the increasing number of potential eavesdroppers.
On the other hand, as the base layers are not cached at the
untrusted BSs, for a larger Mu, more cache capacity can be
utilized to transmit the enhancement-layer subfiles. Hence,
the transmit power of the optimal/suboptimal scheme is only
enlarged moderately when Mu increases from 1 to 2; in the
high cache capacity regime, the increase in transmit power is
even negligible. Due to the cooperative transmission of the
base-layer and enhancement-layer subfiles, in Fig. 5(b), the
secrecy outage probability monotonically decreases with the
cache capacity for Mu ≤ 2. However, when Mu increases
from 2 to 3, both the transmit power and the secrecy outage
probability are increased significantly; particularly, their values
saturate at high levels for cache capacities exceeding 600 MB.
This is because, for Mu = 3, the total number of antennas
equipped at the untrusted BSs equals the total number of
antennas equipped at the trusted BSs; hence, the available
DoFs for secure transmission of the base-layer subfiles are
limited, irrespective of the cache capacities, as the cache of
the untrusted small cell BSs can only facilitate the cooperative
transmission of enhancement-layer subfiles. Hence, for secure
delivery of the base-layer subfiles, the system has to allocate
large amounts of power to AN transmission to degrade the
reception quality of the untrusted BSs and, at the same time,
to the users’ signals to mitigate the impact of the interference
caused by AN to the legitimate users.
Finally, Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) show the performance of the
proposed schemes and Baseline 3 for larger networks, where
the number of users, K , the number of small cells, M − 1,
and the number of untrusted small cell BSs, Mu, satisfy
M = K + 1 and Mu = K/10. We consider a system
bandwidth of 7 MHz to ensure that, despite the large number
of users, the QoS requirements of each user can be fulfilled
with high probability. For Baseline 3, the caching decisions
are determined by employing Algorithms 1 and 2, and the
resulting schemes are referred to as “Baseline 3 optimal” and
“Baseline 3 suboptimal”, respectively. For K = 50, only the
performance of the proposed suboptimal and baseline subop-
timal schemes is shown because of the high computational
complexity of the optimal schemes. As K increases, more
untrusted BSs, Mu = K/10, are present in the network and
each untrusted BS can eavesdrop a larger number of users.
Hence, the available DoFs per BS for the delivery of the base-
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Fig. 5. (a) Total BS transmit power and (b) secrecy outage probability
of the proposed optimal (solid line) and suboptimal (dotted line)
schemes versus cache capacity for different numbers of untrusted
BSs.
layer subfiles is reduced and the likelihood of data leakage
is increased. Therefore, to ensure secure video streaming,
for larger K , a larger average transmit power per BS is
needed for AN transmission. On the other hand, exploiting
both trusted and untrusted BSs for cooperative transmission,
the proposed schemes significantly outperform Baseline 3,
particularly for networks with large numbers of users and large
cache capacities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, secure video streaming was investigated for
small cell networks with untrusted small cell BSs which can
intercept both cached and delivered video data. SVC coding
and caching were jointly exploited to facilitate secure coopera-
tive MIMO transmission and to not only mitigate the negative
impact of the untrusted BSs but to exploit them for secrecy
enhancement. A two-timescale non-convex robust optimization
problem was formulated to optimize caching and delivery
for minimization of the total BS transmit power required for
secure video streaming with imperfect CSI knowledge. In the
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Fig. 6. (a) Average transmit power per BS and (b) secrecy outage
probability versus cache capacity for the proposed optimal and
suboptimal schemes and Baseline 3, where M = K + 1 and
Mu = K/10.
large timescale, the caching optimization problem was solved
offline by a modified GBD algorithm. To reduce the com-
putational complexity, a suboptimal caching algorithm was
also studied. In the short timescale, the delivery optimization
problem for a given cache status was solved online by SDP.
Simulation results revealed that, compared to several baseline
schemes, the proposed optimal and suboptimal schemes can
significantly enhance both the secrecy and the power efficiency
of video streaming in small cell networks as long as the total
number of antennas at the trusted BSs exceeds that at the
untrusted BSs.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We begin the proof by defining an auxiliary optimization
problem:
P2: minimize
Dt, st,q
∑
t∈T0
[UTP (q,Dt) + fPen (st)] (35)
subject to C3, C8, C9, C12, Dt ∈ Dt, st  0, q ∈ Q,
where Dt is given in (25). Problems P2 and {(25),
(26)} are equivalent as minx∈X , y∈Y f (x, y) =
miny∈Y [minx∈X f (x, y)] [43].
Because of the perturbation, the feasible set of problem
P2 is a superset of the feasible set of problem P1. Thus, if
P1 is feasible, so is P2 (and (25)). Moreover, the inequality
constraint functions on the left hand sides of the big-M
constraints C3, C8, and C9 are bounded from above, e.g.,
tr(ΛmWρ,l,t)− qf(ρ),l,mPmaxm ≤ Pmaxm for C3. Considering
st  0 on the right hand sides of C3, C8, and C9, the
feasibility statement in part i) of Proposition 1 thus always
holds for any q ∈ Q.
Next, we show the optimality statement in part i) by con-
tradiction. Assume that (q∗,D∗t ) solves P1. Then (q
∗,D∗t , st)
with st  0 is feasible for P2. Denote the objective
function of P2 by f (q,Dt, st). We have f (q,Dt,0) ≥
f (q∗,D∗t ,0) , ∀(q,Dt). Besides, let (q+,D+t , s+t ) be the
optimal solution of P2. If (q+,D+t ) 6= (q∗,D∗t ), then s+t 6= 0
necessarily holds. However, since µ≫ 1, we have fPen
(
s+t
)
>
f (q∗,D∗t ,0) and thus f
(
q+,D+t , s
+
t
)
> f (q∗,D∗t ,0),
which contradicts the optimality of
(
q+,D+t , s
+
t
)
. Therefore,
part i) is proved.
Finally, we prove part ii). Obviously, i) implies that problem
P1 is infeasible when ν (q) = +∞. Assume that the optimal
solution of problem P2,
(
q+,D+t , s
+
t
)
, satisfies s+t 6= 0. Then,
a feasible solution of the form (q,Dt,0) does not exist for P2,
since otherwise, f
(
q+,D+t , s
+
t
) ≤ f (q,Dt,0) has to hold.
Therefore, P1 is also infeasible, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
As strong duality holds for (25), we know that
(Dkt , s
k
t ) minimizes the Lagrangian, i.e., (D
k
t , s
k
t ) ∈
argminDt∈Dt, st0Lqk(Dt, st;λkt ). Since Lqk(Dt, st) =
f1(q
k;λkt ) + f2(Dt, st;λ
k
t ), where f1(q
k;λkt ) is a constant,
we also have (Dkt , s
k
t ) ∈ argminDt∈Dt, st0f2(Dt, st;λkt ).
Finally, i) has to hold as Lq (Dt, st;λt) is separable w.r.t. q
and {Dt, st} in (30), cf. (27).
Meanwhile, according to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions for (25), we have
λC3,kρ,l,m,t[tr(ΛmW
k
ρ,l,t)− qkf(ρ),l,mPmaxm − sC3,kρ,l,m,t] = 0,
λC8,kρ,l,j,t[tr(W
k
ρ,l,t −W
k
ρ,l,j,t)− qkf(ρ),l,jPmax − sC8,kρ,l,j,t] = 0,
λC9,kρ,l,j,t[tr(W
k
ρ,l,j,t)− (1− qkf(ρ),l,j)Pmax − sC9,kρ,l,j,t] = 0,
Therefore,
min
Dt∈Dt, st0
f2(Dt, st;λ
k
t )
= f2(D
k
t , s
k
t ;λ
k
t )
= UTP
(
qk,Dkt
)
+ fPen
(
skt
)− f1(qk;λkt ). (36)
By substituting (36) into Lq(Dt, st;λkt ), (31) is established.
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Let q̂ ∈ Q be a solution of (30). By Algorithm 1, the
optimality cut α ≥ ξ(q; λ̂t) is then generated for q = q̂.
We have ξ(q̂; λ̂t) = ν(q̂) due to the strong duality of the
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respective SDP subproblem (25) for q = q̂. If (q, α) were to
solve (30) again in another iteration with q = q̂, then α ≥
ξ(q; λ̂t) and α ≥ ν(q̂) = ν(q) would hold, which lead to the
termination of Algorithm 1 since LB ≥ UB, cf. line 2. This
implies that q̂ does not repeat itself in intermediate iterations.
Since set Q ⊆ {0, 1}F×L×M is finite, Algorithm 1 has to
converge in a finite number of iterations.
To prove the equivalence between P1 and P0, we show
here that the solution of the relaxed problem P1 satisfies
rank(Wρ,l,t) = 1 with probability one. Let Υρ,l,t  0,
Φρ,l,t  0, and Θρ,l,t  0 be the Lagrange multipliers
associated with constraints C˜6, C10, and C12: Wρ,l,t  0,
respectively, where C12 is implied by C10. The Lagrangian
of problem P1 is given by,
L(Wρ,l,t;Υρ,l,t,Φρ,l,t,Θρ,l,t) =∑
ρ,l
tr
[(
Bρ,l,t −Θρ,l,t − 1ηreq
ρ,l
Uρ,tΥρ,l,tU
H
ρ,t
)
Wρ,l,t
]
+∆2,
(37)
where Bρ,l,t , I +∆1 − Φρ,l,t; and ∆1  0 and ∆2 ∈ R
denote the collection of terms that are relevant and irrelevant
toWρ,l,t, respectively. Hence, the dual problem of P1 is given
by
max
Υρ,l,t0,Φρ,l,t0,Θρ,l,t0
min
Wρ,l,t
L(Wρ,l,t;Υρ,l,t,Φρ,l,t,Θρ,l,t).
(38)
We now define
Υρ,l,t ,
[
Υρ,l,t γρ,l,t
γHρ,l,t αρ,l,t
]
∈ C(N+1)×(N+1), (39)
where Υρ,l,t  0, αρ,l,t ≥ 0 and γρ,l,t is chosen to ensure
Υρ,l,t  0. If P0 is feasible, so is P1, and then Wρ,l,t 6= 0.
Moreover, as strong duality holds for SDP subproblem (25),
the optimal beamformers and the optimal dual solutions satisfy
the KKT optimality conditions. In particular, by substituting
Uρ,t = [IN , ĥρ,t] and (39) into (37), we have
Bρ,l,t − αρ,l,tηreq
ρ,l
ĥρ,tĥ
H
ρ,t = Θρ,l,t, (40)
Θρ,l,tWρ,l,t = 0, (41)
where Bρ,l,t = Bρ,l,t −
1
ηreq
ρ,l
(
Υρ,l,t + γρ,l,tĥ
H
ρ,t + γ
H
ρ,l,tĥρ,t
)
.
Next, we show by contradiction that Bρ,l,t ≻ 0 holds with
probability one. Assume that Bρ,l,t has at least one non-
positive eigenvalue τ ≤ 0 and the corresponding eigenvec-
tor is w˜ρ,l,t, i.e., (Bρ,l,t − τI)w˜ρ,l,t = 0. Let Wρ,l,t =
βw˜ρ,l,tw˜
H
ρ,l,t  0, where β > 0. By substituting Wρ,l,t into
(38), we further have
L(Wρ,l,t;Υρ,l,t,Φρ,l,t,Θρ,l,t) = β τ
∑
ρ,l
w˜Hρ,l,tw˜ρ,l,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
− β
∑
ρ,l
αρ,l,t
ηreq
ρ,l
ĥHρ,tw˜ρ,l,tw˜
H
ρ,l,tĥρ,t+∆2. (42)
Hence, if αρ,l,t = 0, then w˜ρ,l,t = 0 necessarily holds
to ensure L > −∞; yet this contradicts the condition that
Wρ,l,t 6= 0. On the other hand, if αρ,l,t > 0, then the
minimum value of (38) is obtained for β →∞, since hρ,t is
statistically independent and −β αρ,l,t
ηreq
ρ,l
ĥHρ,tw˜ρ,l,tw˜
H
ρ,l,tĥρ,t →
−∞ with probability one. That is, the dual problem (38) is un-
bounded from below, and consequently, the primal problem is
infeasible, which is also a contradiction. Therefore,Bρ,l,t ≻ 0
is proved.
Finally, based on (40), (41), and Bρ,l,t ≻ 0, we have,
rank(Wρ,l,t)
(a)
= rank(Bρ,l,tWρ,l,t)
(b)
= rank
(αρ,l,t
ηreq
ρ,l
Wρ,l,tĥρ,tĥ
H
ρ,t
)
(c)≤ min
{
rank
(αρ,l,t
ηreq
ρ,l
Wρ,l,t
)
, rank
(
ĥρ,tĥ
H
ρ,t
)}
≤ 1, (43)
where (a) is due to Bρ,l,t ≻ 0, (b) is a result of (40) and (41),
and (c) follows from the basic rank inequality rank(AB) ≤
min {rank(A), rank(B)}. On the other hand, sinceWρ,l,t 6=
0, the condition rank(Wρ,l,t) = 1 holds with probability one.
This completes the proof.
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